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Efficiency of Viable Groundwater Management Policies 3 
Abstract 4 
We investigate the relative performance of simple groundwater policies in a spatially detailed 5 
aquifer and reveal the distribution of net benefits from those policies.  Groundwater policy is 6 
plagued with a high level of complexity in achieving the first best outcome, which may be costly 7 
and politically infeasible to adopt. We parameterize a 8,457 cell spatially detailed model of the 8 
Northwest Kansas section of the Ogallala Aquifer and find that simple pricing, quantity, and 9 
water market policies perform poorly but can be improved upon by localized policies that are 10 
more efficient and garner more popular support.   11 
 12 
Key words: Hydraulic Conductivity, Common Pool Resource, Groundwater Management, Water 13 
Markets, Ogallala 14 
JEL codes: C63, D62, D90, Q10, Q15, Q25  15 
        16 
Groundwater represents roughly 96% of the world’s unfrozen fresh water resources and 17 
approximately 60% of the groundwater extracted is used for agriculture (Jousma and Roelofsen 18 
2004). Depletion of these resources is of great concern throughout the world, especially where 19 
extraction consistently outstrips natural recharge.  For example, there are many areas throughout 20 
the world where aquifers face depletion such as the Ogallala aquifer, the Central Valley of 21 
California in the United States, the North China Plains Aquifer (Qui 2010), or a series of shallow 22 
aquifers, including the Neogene and Dammam aquifers in eastern Saudi Arabia.  These aquifers 23 
are in danger mainly because the irrigation needs in these areas are much larger than what can be 24 
supported sustainably (Gleeson 2012).  The cumulative extraction of groundwater for irrigation 25 
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has resulted in considerable decrease in land values as depletion reduces remaining stocks and 26 
increases extraction costs (Hornbeck and Keskin 2011).  However, spatial variation is also 27 
important; while total water supplies in a region or country may be larger than the aggregate 28 
demand, areas with concentrated irrigation may run out of water because groundwater takes time 29 
to flow through the ground due to finite hydraulic conductivity.  There are of course other drivers 30 
of groundwater policy that could be important as well, such as stream flow considerations, 31 
ecosystem services, or transboundary issues where groundwater traverses political boundaries. 32 
Regardless of the specific context or drivers of local groundwater policies, groundwater 33 
management can be complicated and, a priori, the net benefits of simple management regimes in 34 
a complex aquifer are unclear.  Many previous studies have found a small net benefit overall 35 
from optimal management, but these models were not designed to assess the distribution of 36 
gains. Even if the net benefit is small on average over a large aquifer, there may be large 37 
gains/losses for farmers and other water users in certain locations. Such variations are policy 38 
relevant because they provide insights on which policy instruments would be politically feasible 39 
and how the net benefit would be distributed.  To satisfy the first best management policy, water 40 
conservation may need to be regulated at a field level and would change season to season to 41 
incorporate groundwater flows, precipitation, and water demand at a field level.  While this 42 
detailed policy may retrieve the maximum net benefit from management it may require a high 43 
level of monitoring and enforcement which most likely renders it unattractive due to the high 44 
economic cost as well as political infeasibility.  These complications generally make simpler 45 
policies, such as uniform taxes, quantity restrictions, or simple markets more attractive to water 46 
managers and policy makers.   Our goal in this paper is to investigate how well simple policies, 47 
in particular, policies that are spatially uniform, perform in terms of increasing net benefits.  Can 48 
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simple policies that ignore the underlying hydrogeology of the aquifer deliver substantial net 49 
benefits and what is the distribution of these net benefits across the farmers on the aquifer? 50 
One highly touted policy is a water market where permit holders can trade for rights to 51 
groundwater extraction.  Several countries including Australia, Chile, India, and the United 52 
States have instituted various forms of water markets (Bauer 1997, Mukherji 2004, Brennan 53 
2006, Brown 2006, Hadjigeorgalis 2009, Goemans and Prichett 2014).  Policy experts have also 54 
called for expansion of water markets as an effective tool to deal with spatial inefficiencies in 55 
reducing the costs of water restrictions (Thompson et al. 2009).  Several studies have analyzed 56 
possible gains from water markets in general, pricing in such markets, and practical concerns of 57 
adopting a market (Colby et al. 1993, Murphy et al. 2000, Weinberg 2002, Didri and Khanna 58 
2005, Palazzo and Brozovic 2014, Brozovic and Young 2014) as well as the interaction of water 59 
markets and water quality (Weinberg et al. 1993).  Carey and Zilberman (2002) evaluate 60 
technology choice, crop choice, and capital investment with water markets.  Palazzo and 61 
Brozovic (2014) find that groundwater trading could significantly reduce the abatement costs of 62 
farmers and therefore provide cost savings, but that the cost savings can vary greatly by location 63 
when trading restrictions are enforced.  Others highlight the important struggles and design 64 
considerations when implementing groundwater markets, such as strong and consistent 65 
institutions across basins (Wheeler et al. 2014).   66 
We are interested in what might be called "second best" groundwater management 67 
policies, in the sense that they are simple instruments to implement while yielding a higher net 68 
benefit than doing nothing.  The nomenclature may be slightly misleading as we do not actually 69 
identify the second best policy; we assess simple policies in the absence of the first best, as 70 
measured by the present value net benefits to users compared to the status quo.1  In particular, we 71 
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determine the present value net benefits compared to the status quo from spatially uniform price 72 
and quantity restrictions.  We also investigate how static water markets perform over the life of 73 
the aquifer.  Models analyzing the benefits of water markets (Palazzo and Brozovic 2014) 74 
implicitly assume that exhaustion is not a primary concern therefore there are only benefits from 75 
water markets in a static framework.  But simple water markets that do not specifically account 76 
for local depletion could be damaging over time as they may exacerbate depletion of a 77 
productive well.  Other studies have examined pricing policies and efficiency; Tsur and Dinar 78 
(1997) review different pricing policies and water markets and consider their implementation 79 
costs across many countries.  Sekhri (2011) studies the effect of public provision of groundwater 80 
and finds that it may conserve water in Northern India.  Burness and Brill (2001) investigate 81 
second best policy measures in Curry County, New Mexico, and find significant differences 82 
between the first best and second best policies, but also find overall net benefits to be small.  83 
Like many other studies, Burness and Brill (2001) use a 'bathtub' model in which the aquifer is 84 
modeled as a single cell and the height of water is uniform across the entire aquifer, making 85 
lateral water movement instantaneous. Thus, when a withdrawal of water occurs water decreases 86 
in height throughout the aquifer in a uniform fashion, as it would when draining a bathtub.  87 
Another implicit assumption in the bathtub model is that land quality and farmers’ technology is 88 
uniform, so that the surplus earned from extraction is equivalent to that of a single representative 89 
farmer. Thus, these models do not assess the role of spatial heterogeneity nor the distribution of 90 
gains and losses across farmers.   91 
We assess the ability of simple spatially uniform groundwater management policies -- 92 
policies that may be appealing in a realistic setting due to their simple design -- to yield net 93 
benefits in an area where groundwater management is driven by aquifer depletion.  We use a 94 
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multi-cell model of the aquifer in which groundwater flows from cell to cell, consistent with the 95 
hydrologic properties of the aquifer.  By explicitly modeling the lateral flow of water between 96 
cells in the aquifer we provide a more accurate representation of local water scarcity and water 97 
depths that individual farmers face.  This distinction is important as the size and distribution of 98 
net benefits can vary based on location or heterogeneity in demand for water as seen in Guilfoos 99 
et al. (2013).  100 
Others before us have investigated the gradual movement of groundwater and its 101 
implications for policy (Zimmerman 2001, Brozovic et al. 2010, Savage and Brozovic 2011, 102 
Athanassoglou et al. 2012, Suter et al. 2012, Kuwayama and Brozovic 2013) and there is a 103 
growing trend in the literature to incorporate lateral water flows into economic analyses.  The 104 
lateral flow of water has been considered, for example, in the context of trading ratios in water 105 
markets (Palazzo and Brozovic 2014), land-surface zoning (Adams and Foster 1992) and well 106 
spacing requirements (Johnson 1982).  Mulligan et al. (2014) also use a similar modeling 107 
approach to our paper but ours is distinct in three important ways. We construct demand for 108 
groundwater in which costs depend on the extraction rate and level; they use crop choice where 109 
costs do not vary with extraction.  We explicitly model extraction costs as an important element 110 
of the changing groundwater height.  They restrict their analysis to a flat tax and uniform quota--111 
we include these policies but also consider variable taxes, water markets, and local management 112 
schemes.  We also differentiate our contribution by evaluating the drivers of the individual 113 
benefits from these policies and look at the distribution of net benefits. We focus on determining 114 
the spatial and therefore, across farmer, distribution of net benefits from simple groundwater 115 
management strategies in the presence of low hydraulic conductivity. 116 
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 The specific policies that we investigate are: 1) a flat tax, which is uniform over space 117 
(and so also farmers) and time; 2) a temporally variable tax, which is uniform over space and 118 
farmers but varies over time; 3) quantity restrictions, which are percentage reductions that are 119 
uniform over space and time; 4) static water markets, which allocate water across space but not 120 
across time; and2 5) local area management where a smaller area within the aquifer is managed 121 
with simple pricing and quantity policies.  In each case, we focus on the optimal policy which 122 
achieves the highest net benefit possible given constraints on the resolution of the policy tool, 123 
such as constraining the policy to be uniform across the aquifer.  To simplify comparison, we 124 
assume that the tax revenues raised under the two tax policies are returned to the farmers via a 125 
non-distortionary lump sum transfer.  The water markets are overlaid on the pricing and quantity 126 
policy tools; for example we use the optimal trajectory of total water extracted under the flat tax 127 
to define the amount of permits distributed in each period in the water market and without any 128 
additional restrictions due to local depletion.  We assess the relative effectiveness of these 129 
policies by calibrating our model to the Groundwater Management District 4 in Northwest 130 
Kansas, which overlays the Ogallala Aquifer and which is subject to concerns of depletion (see  131 
figure 1). 132 
We choose these policies because the differentials between them identify factors that 133 
contribute to the distribution of net benefits across different farmers and their relevance to 134 
groundwater management practices.  For example, the difference between the optimal flat tax 135 
and the optimal variable tax identifies the degree to which an improved inter-temporal allocation 136 
adds to the net benefits from groundwater management.  The difference between an optimal flat 137 
tax and the water market using the same quantities identifies the additional net benefits when 138 
water is allocated to areas with the highest marginal value across space but not across time.  139 
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Markets will capture more net benefits than a uniform policy in a given period, because a 140 
uniform tax raises the already heterogeneous cost of pumping so does not equalize marginal 141 
returns while trading allows for spatially differentiated water use if low-value irrigators sell to 142 
high-value irrigators.   An alternative to markets, which may be more feasible, is to have 143 
spatially non-uniform policies such as quantity restrictions tied to local hydrologic conditions. 144 
This local management paradigm underlies the Kansas law that enables the creation of Local 145 
Enhanced Management Areas (LEMAs) which are smaller geographical units of management 146 
voluntarily formed and managed by the farmers residing in the area.  147 
Our primary contributions to the literature are twofold. First, we determine the spatial 148 
distribution of net benefits across individual farmers from the specific policies we consider. 149 
Second, we identify the micro-level factors that underlie that spatial distribution of net benefits 150 
and that result in some farmers having significant gains compared to others.  By modeling a 151 
basic component of hydrology, the lateral movement of water, we add spatial detail to our model 152 
that captures an important element of realism that farmers encounter and which will help 153 
determine more realistically the height of water that farmers face and the particular benefit that 154 
they will experience from a groundwater management policy.  The distribution of net benefits 155 
can be important when considering how politically feasible a policy is; if the median user does 156 
not benefit from a given policy we can expect that the policy may be difficult to implement in a 157 
popular vote.  The distribution of net benefits may also be important to policy design because 158 
some farmers may have large gains from a policy even though the average gains are 159 
insignificant. 160 
Our results for the Ogallala aquifer in the northwest section of Kansas suggest that simple 161 
pricing policies and quantity restrictions may not be very effective and achieve small net benefits 162 
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because of their spatially uniform properties.  These results are subject to a number of 163 
assumptions to be generalizable to other groundwater management situations; parts of the aquifer 164 
are depletable in the near future without chance of recovery, there is heterogeneity across the 165 
aquifer in physical or demand characteristics, sources of stochasticity are not important to net 166 
benefits over the long term, the ability to substitute to surface water supplies are limited, and 167 
there are no additional restrictions or rules effecting groundwater management.  A sobering 168 
finding is that simple water markets that do not account for the possibility of local aquifer 169 
depletion can actually perform worse over the life of the aquifer compared to simple pricing 170 
policies because they allocate water to places with high marginal returns in a given period, but 171 
those same places run out of water earlier which becomes detrimental to the benefits of the 172 
policy over time suggesting to us that more spatially or temporally complex markets could be a 173 
productive institution for which to search.  There is a wide variation in returns from each policy 174 
and we do not find overall popular support, by majority rule, for the simple aquifer wide policies.  175 
But we find significant gains in certain areas of the aquifer that we study, and significant 176 
improvements in water markets when locally restricted. This suggests the possibility of finding 177 
popular support for restrictive policies by targeting areas with large potential gains and 178 
announcing a need for localized management policies in those areas.  Through uncovering the 179 
distribution of net benefits from each policy we can identify the factors determining those net 180 
benefits.  For all policies evaluated in this article, the areas that gain the most are the areas in the 181 
aquifer that run dry in the absence of a policy for which farmers can no longer irrigate the land.   182 
Other areas with high net benefits are those with higher per acre return from irrigation and lower 183 
extraction costs, ceteris paribus. 184 
 185 
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Governance 186 
We apply our economic/hydrologic model to the northwest section of Kansas where policy 187 
makers are considering conservation measures in an attempt to better manage the Ogallala 188 
aquifer. The Governor of Kansas has proposed a form of water markets referred to as water 189 
banking.  Water banking was set up in 2005 with the goal of restoring flows to water scarce areas 190 
and to support water trading in central Kansas (Central Kansas Water Bank Association Five 191 
Year Review and Recommendations 2011).  The water bank oversees the deposit, sale or lease of 192 
water rights and receives a small fee for each transaction it facilitates but has been utilized by 193 
few farmers so far.  Water rights deposited in the bank are limited to the quantity historically 194 
used by the farmer, which may be less than the authorized water right so that unused water rights 195 
are restricted from transfer.  Under water banking, water available for use must be reduced by a 196 
minimum of 10%.  There are two forms of reductions possible: a 15% consumptive use reduction 197 
that is applied when a water right is deposited in the bank and another 5-12% conservation 198 
reduction when leasing a water right.  These reductions are required under current policy to be 199 
taken together, so that first a 15% reduction is applied when the water is banked then a minimum 200 
of an additional 5% is reduced from the balance.3  These reductions are meant to encourage less 201 
water use but may be a deterrent to participation in the water market because they act as a 202 
penalty to participation.  There is an important distinction between being voluntarily subject to a 203 
reduction in water use ex post in order to take part in a trading program versus everyone being 204 
subject to a reduction ex ante and then taking part in a voluntary trading program.  Also if the 205 
authorized water extraction is not binding before using the water bank then there is not much 206 
benefit in participating in the water market for an individual farmer.  These reasons may explain 207 
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why the bank has been used infrequently so far.  This observation motivates our model of a water 208 
market where restrictions are made up front and then trading for water rights may occur.   209 
Current legal structures in Kansas make aquifer-wide trading difficult. For example, each 210 
trade involves a revision to the water right of the buyer and seller, which must be approved by 211 
the Division of Water Resources. Among the requirements the trade must meet is that both 212 
parties are extracting water from the same "local source of supply." Further, the increased 213 
pumping by the buyer must not impair the water rights of her neighbors by reducing their water 214 
availability.  In Kansas, these requirements are difficult to meet. For the purpose of our analysis, 215 
we consider a well-functioning market where water can be traded freely and costlessly among 216 
farmers at any given point in time, although we recognize that this would require major changes 217 
and redefinitions of water rights as they are currently defined in northwest Kansas.   218 
An alternative to markets are spatially non-uniform policies such as quantity restrictions 219 
tied to local hydrologic conditions.  Kansas has legislated the opportunity for localized areas 220 
within the Ogallala to form and create their own management plans, the LEMAs.  There are six 221 
LEMAs within our area of study in northwest Kansas, but only one of these LEMAs has actively 222 
moved to reduce water extraction.  The idea behind these smaller sub units within the aquifer is 223 
that by allowing more homogeneous communities to form institutions and rules there may be 224 
more incentives for them to voluntarily reduce collective water usage.  The one active LEMA, 225 
Sheridan County 6 High Priority Area (SD-6 HPA), is the first LEMA to be created in Kansas, in 226 
2012, and has initiated management plans that involve a 20% reduction of their 2010 authorized 227 
limits to groundwater extraction by well.  (See http://gmd4.org/ (SD-6 HPA enhanced 228 
management proposal) for more detail.)  Unrestricted trading between water right holders is 229 
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allowed within the LEMA.  However, to date there have been no trades between water right 230 
holders within SD-6 HPA. 231 
 232 
Model 233 
We construct a multi-cell model of an aquifer in which groundwater flow is governed by 234 
Darcy's Law.  Darcy’s Law is an equation used in hydrology that relates the characteristics of the 235 
aquifer (eg. soil type, hydraulic gradient) to the volume of water that flows from one area in the 236 
aquifer to another adjacent area in the aquifer in a given period of time.  The model is 237 
constructed with N cells (n = 1, 2, …, N) and I farmers (i = 1, 2, …, I < N) that exist on a subset 238 
of the cells that overlies the aquifer, meaning that there are areas of land above the aquifer that 239 
are not irrigated.  Farmers are stationary and choose the amount of water to extract from their 240 
well to irrigate crops.  Each farmer occupies no more than a single cell and there is only one 241 
farmer on each cell.  Furthermore, each farmer owns only a single well so that there are (I < N) 242 
wells in our model.  Because a farmer cannot occupy more than one cell and nor can there be 243 
multiple farmers on any given cell we ensure a unique mapping between cells, wells and farmers 244 
and these terms can be used interchangeably in the text that follows.  To simplify notation, we 245 
refer to the cell occupied by farmer i as cell i and the well owned by farmer i as well i.   246 
Many studies assume a bottomless aquifer in order to evaluate the extraction path of 247 
water as it goes to the steady state.  We institute an uneven bottom to the aquifer that is location 248 
specific, an accurate representation of the Kansas aquifer modeled in this article.  The 249 
significance of instituting a bottom that varies throughout the aquifer is that some cells of the 250 
aquifer that save water increase flows to adjacent areas with lower levels of water, thus 251 
extending the life of those cells of the aquifer and delaying or avoiding potentially large losses.   252 
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Equation (1) describes the demand for water 253 
 254 
𝑊𝑖𝑡  = 𝑔𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖𝑃𝑖𝑡                                 (1)    255 
 256 
where Wit is the volume of water demanded (acre feet), gi > 0 and ki < 0 are demand parameters 257 
and Pit is the price of water ($/acre feet) for farmer i at time t (years).  We assume that wells are 258 
dug deep enough to extract up to the maximum depth possible so the only cost to the farmer is 259 
the marginal pumping cost which is determined by the lift water needs to pumped.  The marginal 260 
pumping cost for farmer i, ?̅?𝑖𝑡, is thus given by: 261 
 262 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡).                              (2)   263 
 264 
𝐶1 > 0 is the marginal cost of pumping one acre foot of water per additional foot of 265 
lift, 𝐿𝑆𝑖 is the land surface elevation faced by farmer i (feet) and 𝐻𝑖𝑡 is the water level (feet) in 266 
the single well owned by farmer i at time t, and the differential between them is the lift (feet) that 267 
farmers must pump water to irrigate their crops. The equation of motion for the height of water 268 
in farmer i’s well is defined as    269 
𝐻𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡 =
𝑅𝑖
𝐴𝑖𝑆
− ∑ (
𝐾𝑖𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝐻𝑖𝑡 − 𝐻𝑗𝑡)
𝑑𝑖𝑗𝐴𝑖𝑆
)
𝐽
𝑗≠𝑖
−
(1 − 𝛼)𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑆
                    (3) 270 
 271 
where Ri is volumetric natural recharge (acre feet), and, Ki, hydraulic conductivity (feet/year) 272 
describes the nature of the soil that water flows through is location specific but time invariant.  273 
Specific yield4, S (unitless), is the volume of water a unit of soil can hold and α, the return 274 
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coefficient, is the fraction of water extracted that percolates back into the aquifer. Ai is the 275 
surface area of the land that a farmer inhabits (acres) and CAijt is the cross-sectional area through 276 
which water flows between the cells adjacent to farmer i’s cell (acres). The cross-sectional area, 277 
the area that water flows through, changes over time by the average of the saturated thickness 278 
between two adjoining cells: if water is extracted faster than the natural recharge and lateral 279 
flows can replenish the cell, the saturated thickness for that cell will decrease as will the cross-280 
sectional area.  J is the number of adjacent cells that share a side with cell i.  The distance 281 
between adjacent cells i and j, dij (feet), is equal to the distance between the centroid of each cell.   282 
Including the interaction term between cells creates the difference between a model with finite 283 
hydraulic conductivity such as this model and the bathtub model that implicitly has instantaneous 284 
lateral groundwater flows. 285 
The aquifer is restricted to have a cell specific bottom with elevation 𝐵𝑖  (feet), which 286 
dictates the minimum height of water in a cell. Water can still flow through cells until there is no 287 
water left; when saturated thickness is equal to zero water can only flow into the cell.  Farmers 288 
on the other hand can only pump water until saturated thickness is equal to δ as stated in 289 
Equation (4)   290 
 291 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = {
= 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑖𝑡 < 𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿
> 0 𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝐵𝑖 + 𝛿
               (4) 292 
Farmers face this constraint because pumping becomes infeasible before saturated thickness 293 
reaches zero:  as saturated thickness is reduced a greater amount of soil and rock gets pumped up 294 
with the groundwater eventually making it impossible to pump water.  Once the water level in 295 
farmer i’s well reaches this level of saturated thickness it can no longer be pumped for the rest of 296 
the simulation, that is, we assume that the natural recharge is small enough that once wells go 297 
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dry they are typically not usable for irrigation any longer and the cessation of irrigation is 298 
irreversible.  While this is not always the case in practice, it is true that once wells go dry they 299 
are typically not used for irrigation again; for institutional reasons farmers lose legal access to 300 
the water rights when they go unused in Kansas. 301 
 302 
Farmer Behavior 303 
To evaluate alternative water management policies in our model we assume a baseline farmer 304 
behavior, apply policy scenarios, and evaluate the private net benefit resulting from a given 305 
policy.  Our baseline assumption is that farmers are myopic and each farmer i maximizes her 306 
private net benefit from agriculture in each period sequentially, with no multi-period decision-307 
making considered and without regard to other use or non-use values associated with water use.  308 
This myopic behavior is referred to as competitive pumping in much of the groundwater 309 
literature.  The reasons for assuming this behavior are as follows: 1) it has been empirically 310 
difficult to reject myopic farmer behavior (Savage and Brozovic 2011; Suter et al. 2012), 2) Karp 311 
(2012) shows that when there are more than a few agents extracting a common pool resource that 312 
open-access behavior is a good approximation under many conditions, and 3) in a complex 313 
spatial groundwater model the informational assumptions needed to assume individual strategic 314 
behavior across the aquifer are high.  For example, it seems unrealistic to assume that a farmer 315 
knows all current and future lateral flows through the aquifer and will engage in the iterative 316 
process needed to calculate a best response extraction path in a detailed model of an aquifer.   317 
Net benefit for farmer i at time t is given by Equation (5), derived from Equations (1) and 318 
(2). 319 
 320 
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𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  =
𝑊𝑖𝑡
2
2𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
− 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡)𝑊 𝑖𝑡 .           (5) 321 
 322 
The first order condition for simple profit maximization can be found by differentiating 323 
equation (5) with respect to water use: taking water height in the well as given in each period, 324 
each farmer’s optimal extraction is where the marginal benefit of water use is equal to marginal 325 
pumping cost:  326 
 327 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
= 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡)  = ?̅?𝑖𝑡 .                        (6)                      328 
 329 
The discounted net benefit for the entire aquifer over the model horizon is given by Equation (7) 330 
 331 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑁𝐵𝑖𝑡  = ∑ ∑
1
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
(
𝑊𝑖𝑡
2
2𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
− 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡)𝑊 𝑖𝑡) .
𝑇
𝑡
𝐼
𝑖
         (7)            332 
 333 
 In the baseline scenario, farmers over-extract groundwater at their own well due to the 334 
shared properties of the aquifer; in the social planner’s problem there is an additional term in 335 
Equation (6) capturing the marginal user cost. In the scenarios that follow we evaluate the net 336 
benefits under second best pricing policies as well as quantity restrictions.  We do this by 337 
maximizing Equation (7) subject to the constraints of each policy (in addition to the other model 338 
constraints) and comparing the net benefit to that obtained under the baseline scenario of myopic 339 
competitive pumping in the absence of any policy restrictions.  In effect, this amounts to defining 340 
the policy instrument as the control variable to find the optimal constrained policy.  In the base 341 
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case scenario farmers are restricted to pumping up to their 2010 authorized limit. 5   The 342 
authorized limit is assigned by the Kansas Water Authority and puts a cap on the acre feet of 343 
water allowed to be pumped by a well.     344 
 345 
Flat Tax 346 
The flat tax is defined in this paper as a tax that is uniform across all the farmers in the aquifer as 347 
well as constant over time.  That is, the tax raises the per unit price of water for all farmers by the 348 
same percentage. In the base case farmers choose Wit defined by the price of water in Equation 349 
(2).  With a flat tax farmers choose Wit defined by the price of water in Equation (8). Note that 350 
because of differences in location relative to other farmers, height of water in the well, and 351 
spatial variation in the physical properties of the aquifer each farmer is affected differently by the 352 
flat tax even though all farmers face an identical tax rate.  In particular, farmers with a greater lift 353 
face a higher tax in dollar terms compared to farmers with lower lift.   354 
Farmers adjust their behavior by setting the marginal benefit of extraction equal to the 355 
marginal cost of extraction in the face of the optimal flat tax as described in Equation (9).  356 
Discounted net benefit is measured by Equation (7) and the flat tax rate chosen is the one that 357 
maximizes the value of this equation which is the net benefit, a tax refunded net benefit.  This 358 
captures the benefit of reduced groundwater pumping while making the results comparable to 359 
other non-tax based policies. 360 
 361 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) ∗ (1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)                             (8) 362 
 363 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
= 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) ∗ (1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)                       (9)      364 
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Variable Tax 365 
The variable tax is a tax that is uniform across all the farmers in the aquifer but is allowed to vary 366 
over time.  We find the optimal variable tax that maximizes the discounted net benefit over the 367 
entire aquifer.  With a variable tax farmers choose Wit defined by the price of water in Equation 368 
(10).  Farmers set the marginal benefit of extraction equal to the marginal cost of extraction in 369 
the face of the variable tax as shown in Equation (11).  For the sake of computational ease, we 370 
restrict taxes to change six times over the course of the simulation:  as the number of parameters 371 
to be estimated increase the parameter space increases exponentially making it numerically very 372 
burdensome in a detailed model like ours.6  Discounted net benefit over the entire aquifer is 373 
again measured by Equation (7) which is the tax refunded net benefit. 374 
 375 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) ∗ (1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡)                             (10) 376 
 377 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
= 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) ∗ (1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡)                      (11)      378 
 379 
It is important to note that in both the flat and variable tax scenarios, we assume that the 380 
tax revenue raised is returned to the farmers through a non-distortionary lump sum transfer so 381 
that the net benefits may be calculated without the tax and given by equation (7).  This simplifies 382 
the comparison between tax policies, quantity restrictions, and water markets. 383 
 384 
Quantity Restrictions 385 
In Kansas, each well is restricted to a maximum quantity of water extracted per year. In this 386 
scenario we use the acre feet per well allocated in 2010 to set this limit and explore cases where 387 
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this limit is reduced by the same percentage for all farmers, like a uniform rollback of the 388 
authorized water rights.   Farmers will behave just as they have in the base case scenario but will 389 
only be allowed to extract up to the volume of water defined by the limit in Equation (12)   390 
 391 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≤ (1 − 𝑥) ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑖,2010                     (12) 392 
 393 
where x refers to the percentage reduction below the 2010 allocated limit for farmer i.  Equation 394 
(6) still describes the behavior of the farmer in a given period but now farmers are restricted by 395 
Equation (12).  As before, discounted net benefit is measured by Equation (7).   396 
 397 
Water Market 398 
In this section we describe the properties of the water market and formalize the equilibrium state 399 
that exists when a market is established.  We describe the water market as a static problem with a 400 
constraint on the total water extracted in any period, 𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  (total number of permits issued) but with 401 
no other constraints such as those due to local depletion arising from the market itself.  In this 402 
water market, farmers are not constrained by individual limits but by the final number of permits 403 
they hold.  The aggregate net benefit in any period is given by the expression in parentheses in 404 
equation (7) and is subject to the constraint that ∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅
𝐼
𝑖 . The Lagrangian for the problem is 405 
given by Equation (13) 406 
 407 
ℒ = ∑ (
𝑊𝑖𝑡
2
2𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
𝑊𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡)𝑊𝑖𝑡) − 𝜆𝑡 (∑ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?
𝐼
𝑖
)                (13)
𝐼
𝑖
 408 
 409 
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where the height of water, Hit, in any period is determined by the actions of the farmers in the 410 
previous periods, but is considered exogenous in this problem.  The solution to (13) gives the 411 
optimal allocation of water across farmers at a point in time, but does not insure an optimal 412 
allocation of water to farmers over time.  At the optimum, the marginal net benefit is equalized 413 
across all farmers, and is equal to the permit price, λt, so that  414 
 415 
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
− 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) =
𝑊𝑗𝑡
𝑘𝑗
−
𝑔𝑗
𝑘𝑗
− 𝐶1(𝐿𝑆𝑗 − 𝐻𝑗𝑡) = 𝜆𝑡      ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗.          (14) 416 
 417 
By substituting Equation (14) into the constraint that total water extracted cannot exceed 𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ , we 418 
retrieve the optimal allocation of water as  419 
 420 
𝑊∗𝑖𝑡 =
𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝐶1 ∑ [((𝐿𝑆𝑖 − 𝐻𝑖𝑡) − (𝐿𝑆𝑗 − 𝐻𝑗𝑡)) 𝑘𝑗]
𝐽
𝑗≠𝑖 + ∑ (
𝑔𝑖
𝑘𝑖
−
𝑔𝑗
𝑘𝑗
) 𝑘𝑗
𝐽
𝑗≠𝑖   
∑ (
𝑘𝑗
𝑘𝑖
) + 1
𝐽
𝑗≠𝑖
.               (15)         421 
 422 
This describes the equilibrium allocation of water pumped for all farmers in a period as 423 
there are no further benefits from trade.  Intuitively we can think of three main components 424 
deciding the allocation--acres irrigated, cost of extraction, and marginal productivity of the land.  425 
More acreage, less cost, and highly productive land gets larger allocations of water.  The 426 
denominator of equation (15) accounts for relative number of acres irrigated compared to the 427 
other farmers: holding lift and other factors determining the productivity of irrigation constant, 428 
the only difference between the water  demand across farmers, and therefore between ki and kj, is 429 
due to a difference in the number of acres irrigated in cells i and j.  A farmer with more acres 430 
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irrigated gets a higher allocation from the water market, ceteris paribus.  In addition, since the 431 
marginal extraction cost per additional foot of lift is the same across all farmers, extraction cost 432 
differences are determined by the current period lift, LSi-Hit, with farmers receiving larger 433 
allocations when they have smaller current period lift and therefore extraction costs.  The ratio 434 
gi/ki is the intercept in the inverse demand function for water and reflects the marginal 435 
productivity of irrigation: it captures the effects of unobservables such as soil quality and micro 436 
climate which lead to different yields per acre. The more productive farmers receive larger 437 
allocations of water.7    438 
 We assume there is an interior solution and that the total water constraint is binding at 439 
each time period.  Farmers who run out of water at their location are forced to shut down and 440 
cannot participate in the market.  The farmer specific net benefit from trading permits depend on 441 
the initial allocation of permits which can be manipulated to make all farmers better off, or any 442 
other distribution of gains that are desired.  We focus on the final distribution of water allocated 443 
by the water market to farmers and compare it directly to the welfare of farmers under perfect 444 
competition to simplify the analysis.  As before, aggregate discounted net benefit is measured by 445 
Equation (7).   𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  comes from the given constraint,  since we layer the water market on top of 446 
other policies 𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  will be the total water quantities retrieved by a simple pricing or quantity 447 
policy in each period.   448 
 449 
Local Management Policies 450 
The local management policies mimic the policies over the whole aquifer, as given in the 451 
sections above except each policy is applied to one local management area. Farmers in that area 452 
are subject to the simple policy while farmers outside of the local management area are left to the 453 
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baseline behavior of myopic pumping.  For the pricing policies and quantity restrictions only the 454 
local management area is subject to the tax or quantity restriction as given by Equations (8) and 455 
(10), respectively.  For the water market trading is restricted to the local management area, and 456 
the local area restriction, 𝑊𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ , is the total water quantities retrieved by a simple pricing or quantity 457 
policy in each period from the local management area.   Each farmer in the market over the local 458 
management area is allocated water as defined by Equation (15). The discounted net benefits are 459 
calculated as before with Equation (7) for all policies. 460 
   461 
Data 462 
We calibrate our model to the northwest Kansas section of the Ogallala aquifer using detailed 463 
data sources of water demand and of location specific physical properties of the aquifer.  We 464 
obtain spatially detailed parameters of hydraulic conductivity, saturated thickness, and natural 465 
recharge through the Kansas Water Office (KWO).  Summary descriptive statistics of the 466 
physical properties of the aquifer are given in table 1.  We should note that when calibrating our 467 
model to the Kansas data where there are multiple farmers occupying the geographical area 468 
delineated by a single cell in our model, we aggregate those farmers into a single representative 469 
farmer for that cell.  We run each model simulation for ninety periods as the discounted net 470 
benefit becomes insignificant beyond this point, with each period representing one year.8 471 
 472 
Water Demand Estimates 473 
We estimate water demand from a field level panel of observations utilized by Hendricks and 474 
Peterson (2012) for the Groundwater District 4 section of Kansas that we study.  Following 475 
Hendricks and Peterson (2012), we construct a linear per acre demand curve for water and apply 476 
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our estimates to farmers in the model via GIS maps of field location and documented irrigated 477 
acreage of the fields.  We incorporate spatial fixed effects to control for unobservable spatial 478 
characteristics, such as soil productivity.  The unit of observation for this dataset is the individual 479 
well; water use and well depth are self-reported by farmers from 1992 to 2007, in an unbalanced 480 
panel.   Equation (16) describes the equation estimated, 481 
  482 
𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽
0 + 𝛽1(𝐶𝑃𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
2(𝑃1𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
3(𝑃2𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽
4(𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡) + 𝑆𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠483 
+  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑖𝑡  (16) 484 
 485 
where AWit is the applied acre feet of water per acre, CPit is the cost of pumping an acre foot of 486 
water one foot in lift, P1it is the precipitation from January to April in inches, P2it is the 487 
precipitation from May to August in inches, EVit is evapotranspiration from May to August in 488 
inches, TimeDummies are individual dummy effects for each year that track aggregate changes 489 
over time, whereas spatial fixed effects account for time invariant differences across space such 490 
as soil quality and are consistent in size and space with the cells of the groundwater model as 491 
defined in the simulations.  εit is the error term.  The summary statistics for these variables are 492 
shown in table 2. The price (pumping cost) of water to a farmer is determined by energy prices 493 
and the vertical distance that water is pumped.   494 
We estimate Equation (16) using ordinary least squares.   We do not specify crop choice 495 
or technology so that these variables vary along the demand curve.  In effect this provides an 496 
estimate of an average long run demand curve implicitly changing crop and technology over time 497 
based on the farmer’s location on the demand curve.  For simplicity we do not investigate the 498 
change in acreage associated with a change in the price of water but focus solely on the reduction 499 
24 
 
of water used due to an increase in the price of water and hold acres irrigated constant for a cell 500 
throughout the simulations.  The results for the water demand estimates are given in table 3. 501 
The slope of demand curve for groundwater is given by the estimated coefficient on the 502 
pumping cost, β1=-0.00395.  We use the spatial fixed effects (SFEi) estimated from equation (16) 503 
as parameters in the simulation model, specifically as the per acre intercept for each cell in the 504 
model.  To specify our model consistently with the data we estimate the average slope of the 505 
water demand per acre curve across the region of study, but allow for intercepts to shift by cells 506 
for differences in micro-climates or productivity of the land.  This means that while each 507 
representative farmer in the simulation model has a common per acre slope of the demand curve 508 
they have different per acre intercepts.  Furthermore, even when the per acre slope and intercept 509 
are the same for two farmers in the simulation model, total water demanded may still be different 510 
because of differences in the number of irrigated acres (determined by the water use data from 511 
KWO). Thus, the demand curve for water per irrigated acre is parameterized as  512 
 513 
𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑡  = 𝑆𝐹𝐸𝑖 − 0.00395 ∗ 𝑃 𝑖𝑡 .                            (17) 514 
 515 
Ogallala Aquifer Properties 516 
The KWO provided detailed estimates of hydraulic conductivity, saturated thickness, and natural 517 
recharge in GIS maps that are equivalent to cells in our model.  For the land surface parameter 518 
we use the 2013 National Elevation Dataset (NED) in the form of 1 arc seconds, sourced from 519 
the United States Geological Survey.  We inform our model with these detailed spatial 520 
descriptions of the physical properties of the aquifer.  521 
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We collect the water demand estimates and physical parameters of the aquifer and import 522 
them into the model using NetLogo, software employed in agent-based models.9 Figure 2 depicts 523 
the northwestern Kansas section of the Ogallala aquifer that we model, where grey cells with 524 
black dots represent areas that farmers irrigate and white cells represent land over the aquifer that 525 
is not irrigated.  Black cells are areas that are not a part of the aquifer.  We take the linear 526 
demand per acre given in Equation (17) and multiply that by the acreage irrigated in a cell to 527 
determine the demand for water in a given cell, and for a given representative farmer in that cell.  528 
This provides a heterogeneous spatial estimate of water demand across the aquifer.  The areas 529 
that border the north and west sides of the aquifer are assumed to have no lateral flows with the 530 
aquifer, this may over or under estimate the lateral flows depending on actual height of water in 531 
those locations. 532 
Model Validation 533 
To validate the model we use 2001 estimates of saturated thickness and height of water in cells, 534 
the long run averages of the hydraulic conductivity and recharge provided by the KWO, the 535 
elevation data from the NED and the per acre demand for water from equation (17) and predict 536 
the height of water in each cell in the aquifer in 2010. We interpolate the height of water in the 537 
aquifer at both 2001 and 2010 using the well data from these years and smoothing these heights 538 
over the rest of the aquifer using the interpolation function and Inverse Distance Weighted 539 
method available in ArcGIS using the nearest 15 wells and a power of 2.  This experiment 540 
verifies our ability to predict the dynamics of the aquifer being modeled.  We retrieve a high 541 
correlation coefficient of 0.99 where the predicted height of water in the cells explains the actual 542 
height of water in 2010.10  543 
 544 
Results 545 
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The five policy scenarios we investigate are: 1) a flat tax over time and space (FT), 2) a variable 546 
tax that changes over time but is the same for all farmers (VT), 3) quantity restrictions on the 547 
authorized amount of pumped water, 4) a water market with total water pumped equal to the 548 
amount pumped under the other three policies, in essence the water market is layered on top of 549 
the other policies investigated, and 5) Local Area Management scenarios. Table 4 contains the 550 
results for the two pricing scenarios, the quantity restrictions, and relevant water market 551 
counterparts.   Since our choice of the discount rate (3%) is somewhat arbitrary, we test our 552 
results under a 1% and 5% discount rate as well.  We find that when discount rates are lower 553 
(higher) the overall gains in all policies increase (decrease) but the relative differences in those 554 
policies are similar to main results in reported in Table 4 and we do not report the results under 555 
the alternative discount rates. 556 
The extraction path of groundwater for the entire aquifer under these scenarios is given in 557 
figure 3.  It is important to note that we restrict the amount of water pumped by farmers to their 558 
2010 authorized water limit in the base case (no policy) scenario  -- 476 acre feet of water in the 559 
initial period and limited to a few farmers only -- although this restriction affects the solution 560 
minimally because it is a small amount of water, 0.13% of the total.  The extraction paths for the 561 
flat tax and variable tax are quite similar (but not identical), and because of this the overall 562 
implications of the policies are similar as well.  This suggests that varying the tax over time does 563 
not substantially change the aggregate net benefit compared to a policy that is both spatially and 564 
temporally uniform.  The base case and quantity restricted scenario extraction paths are on top of 565 
each other in figure 3.  The scenario with the optimal quantity restricted, 98% of the 2010 566 
authorized limit, in fact uses roughly 0.1% less water than the base case.   567 
Flat Tax 568 
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As reported in table 2, a 1.02% gain in aquifer-wide net benefits is obtained under a flat tax of 569 
547% relative to the base case scenario with no policy and myopic farmer behavior.  The high 570 
level of tax is a function of the low price elasticity of demand for water.  As shown in figure 4, 571 
overall gains in net benefit are not very sensitive to small changes in tax rates, with average gains 572 
of around 1% and a wide range of tax rates providing roughly the same amount of overall gains.  573 
The optimal flat tax appears to be very high, which may cause shutdown when not returned as a 574 
lump sum transfer or be politically unpopular.  This makes the flat tax pricing policy relatively 575 
unattractive.  576 
While the simple tax policy does not retrieve much net benefit for farmers in total, there 577 
is substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of gains across farmers with some farmers 578 
experiencing a net benefit well above 50%.  The median farmer under this scenario is worse off 579 
with a negative return from this policy, which suggests that this policy will likely be unattractive 580 
to a majority of farmers.  Figure 5 shows a scatterplot of individual farmer’s gains under the 581 
optimal flat tax policy with the dollar gains on the x-axis and the percent gains on the y-axis.  582 
This scatterplot shows a high density of farmers around the origin (0, 0), showing that most 583 
farmers gain little to no advantage from the policy.  The farmers that benefit the most from this 584 
policy are generally ones that are located in cells that run out of water under the status quo and 585 
this policy allows them to irrigate the land further into the future and increase their welfare.   586 
We examine the two farmers with the highest net benefits in dollars under the optimal flat 587 
tax scenario indicated in figure 5 by the diamonds that are circled.  These two farmers have 588 
relatively large amount of irrigated acreage and a small saturated thickness that lead them to 589 
exhaust the groundwater resources in their area of the aquifer under the base case, whereas the 590 
flat tax extends the life of the aquifer at their wells.  But a uniform policy that greatly benefits 591 
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these two farmers does not benefit the majority of farmers because it causes the majority of 592 
farmers to save either too much or too little water.  The farmers with the largest percentage 593 
losses are ones that under the optimal flat tax cannot consume any water because the price is 594 
above their choke price.  There are only three farmers this applies to and the size of their 595 
negative net benefits is relatively small and not material to the total gains for the aquifer. 596 
Variable Tax Results  597 
The variable tax does not improve much on efficiency when compared to the flat tax, capturing 598 
approximately the same amount of the potential gains on average.  We find the optimal variable 599 
tax is decreasing over time starting from 547% and declining to 379% by the end of the 90 year 600 
horizon. 601 
The distribution of gains from the variable tax is essentially identical to the flat tax 602 
distribution which suggests that the time component by itself does not substantially improve or 603 
change gains when the tax policy is uniform over space and time.  The general characteristics of 604 
the farmers with positive and negative net benefits under this policy are also the same as the flat 605 
tax scenario. 606 
 607 
Quantity Restriction Results 608 
Using 2010 authorized acre feet of water limits by well, we simulate a policy that explores 609 
uniform reductions to those limits and measure the effects on discounted net benefits.  The 610 
spatial component to this policy differs from the uniform tax policies in two important ways.  611 
First, the uniform tax based pricing policies will be more burdensome for farmers that have a 612 
larger lift, whereas the quantity restrictions are not necessarily correlated with amount of lift a 613 
farmer faces.  Second, the potential burden that a farmer faces from a quantity restriction 614 
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depends on the gap between the authorized limit of acre feet of water and the profit maximizing 615 
amount of water.  This gap is not uniform over the aquifer and can be large for some farmers 616 
which means that a reduction in the limit is not binding for some farmers.   Figure 6 shows the 617 
gains to discounted net benefit for the aquifer from the corresponding quantity restriction. The 618 
quantity restrictions do not yield much net benefit and perform increasingly worse as they 619 
become more severe. 620 
 The optimal quantity restriction is 98% of the 2010 authorized limit, or a reduction of 2% 621 
below the baseline.  This yields a much smaller savings in water extracted because it is a small 622 
reduction in limits and the non-binding effect it has on some farmers.  And this policy yields a 623 
much smaller increase in overall net benefit compared to the simple tax policy because of the 624 
spatial distribution of the quantity restriction.   625 
Water Markets Results 626 
We investigate a simple, static water market that functions like a cap and trade policy.  The 627 
overall quantity of water extracted in each period is set exogenously and trading for water 628 
permits occurs in each period separately.  The initial distribution of water rights has no effect on 629 
the total gains but only the distribution of gains to individual farmers.  We evaluate the 630 
distribution of gains in total where permits are handed out to the final users efficiently, as if no 631 
trades were needed for ease of comparison.  To reveal the overall benefit of adding a market for 632 
water permits we choose the total water extraction profiles produced in subsections Flat Tax 633 
Results, Variable Tax Results, and Quantity Restriction Results with the water market 634 
determining the allocation of water within a period to the individual farmers rather than a 635 
spatially uniform policy.  It is also important to realize that only the total aquifer quantity 636 
restrictions are binding and individual quantity restrictions are removed in these scenarios.  637 
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Individual quantity restrictions that are binding would complicate the analysis and do not fit the 638 
goal to meet that overall water restriction and provide the optimal individual allocation in one 639 
time period. 640 
 There are small increases and in some cases decreases in overall net benefits from 641 
instituting markets compared to pricing and quantity policies.  The main reason for the relatively 642 
poor performance of the water market is that it puts no explicit value on a well drying up and 643 
allocates water to the highest marginal users each time period. This creates a potential tradeoff 644 
between current period allocative efficiency benefits and future benefits from avoided 645 
exhaustion.  Farmers can choose to participate in the water market, and always benefit when they 646 
choose to do so.  But farmers can do worse in the water market when compared to other policy 647 
scenarios. We compare the water markets, which includes a restriction on the total quantity of 648 
water extracted, to the baseline scenario of no restrictions.  A negative return from the water 649 
market means that even with the ability of buying or selling water permits, given their allocation 650 
of permits the farmer is worse off than if there were no restrictions and no water market over the 651 
time of the simulation.  This fact causes an inefficiency that is greater than the single period 652 
allocative benefits that are provided in the market mainly because the correlation between thin 653 
saturated thickness and high immediate marginal returns from groundwater. Nonetheless, it is 654 
worth noting the considerable heterogeneity in the distribution of net benefits under the water 655 
markets.  In the water markets with flat tax quantities (WMFT) scenario the farmers that 656 
experience the largest absolute increase in private net benefit are generally those that have small 657 
saturated thickness, and the life of their section of the aquifer is extended by a small decrease in 658 
pumping.   Interestingly, the farmers that see the highest percentage gains compared to the 659 
baseline scenario are allocated less water by the market than under the flat tax scenario and have 660 
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thin saturated thickness.  These farmers inadvertently benefit from the market because their life 661 
of their well is extended and therefore experience the largest gains from a market, or stated 662 
differently, the flat tax for these farmers was ‘too small.’  The heterogeneity that drives the water 663 
market in our model is obtained from the physical properties of the aquifer (depth to water, 664 
saturated thickness, hydraulic conductivity, etc.) and from the variation in water demand (spatial 665 
fixed effects, irrigated acreage).  666 
 The water market with the aggregate quantity of water restricted to be the same as the 667 
optimal variable tax (WMVT) quantities is similar to the water market with the aggregate 668 
extraction restricted to the optimal flat tax quantities except that it exacerbates the extinction of 669 
wells because of higher total withdrawals in the aquifer.  The distribution of gains is different 670 
compared to the flat tax quantities because some farmers are allocated more water earlier in 671 
model horizon in the variable tax scenario than the flat tax scenario. These farmers run out of 672 
water earlier under the WMVT scenario and this skews the distribution of gains down even 673 
though the overall gains are very similar.  This is apparent from the smaller value of the 674 
maximum in column (5) of table 4 when compared to column (4) of table 4.  675 
The water markets with the quantity restricted to 98% below the 2010 allocated use or 676 
2% below the baseline yields a small improvement in net benefits from slightly over 0% to 677 
0.11%, primarily through the improved spatial distribution of water.  Here the water market 678 
improves upon the allocative efficiency without materially damaging the life of the wells, 679 
leading to gains above the straight quantity restrictions.     680 
Local Management Results 681 
In this section we institute a LEMA in our model of the aquifer and investigate the simple 682 
policies when applied to the LEMA only, leaving the rest of the aquifer unrestrained.  We 683 
32 
 
investigate LEMA SD-6 HPA which resides mostly in Sheridan County in Kansas and is shown 684 
in figure 7 by the dark shaded area.  In 2012, this LEMA voluntarily instituted a 20% quantity 685 
restriction and we find that this restriction is not binding so that there is no benefit or loss from 686 
the policy under our model. So, instead, we apply three policies, a flat tax, a quantity restriction, 687 
and a water market, that are optimal for the sum of farmers within SD-6 HPA. 688 
Table 5 shows the results for the farmers in SD-6 HPA when the aquifer wide optimal flat 689 
tax is applied to the entire aquifer and when an optimal flat tax for SD-6 HPA is applied just to 690 
that LEMA, leaving other areas unregulated.  These results show that optimizing the simple 691 
pricing policy improves the outcome for the LEMA somewhat--the total net benefit for the 692 
LEMA is 5.63% when the entire aquifer is under the flat tax and 7.25% when the tax optimized 693 
for the LEMA only.  The distributions of net benefits in the LEMA are similar between the two 694 
results and but the localized policy yields larger gains in overall net benefit for the farmers in the 695 
LEMA and widens the distribution by decreasing the minimum gains.  The optimal quantity 696 
restricted is much higher in the SD-6 HPA than the optimal aquifer wide policy.  Instead of a 2% 697 
reduction in authorized pumping, which is nonbinding for farmers in this LEMA, the optimal 698 
quantity restricted is 68%.  These optimal reductions are much greater than current suggestions 699 
in Kansas and they appear to be beneficial to most farmers in the HPA when undertaken jointly.  700 
Furthermore, when the water market is applied to just this LEMA there are substantial 701 
benefits, compared to the aquifer wide water market.  In particular the water market with 702 
quantity restrictions in Table 5, shows that SD-6 could potentially increase discounted net 703 
benefits by 11.5% through large restrictions on pumping and allowing for trading of the water 704 
permits.  The water market provides a much greater benefit when localized, compared to the 705 
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minimal benefit the simply water market provided over the entire aquifer.  This occurs because it 706 
water rights are not moved out of the local area where depletion is especially important. 707 
 The total net benefit is much higher in this LEMA compared to the total aquifer net 708 
benefit from all simple policies, which may be why the LEMA formed in the first place since 709 
they have higher than average returns from implementing groundwater management policies.  710 
The farmers have an incentive to form LEMAs and cooperate when the median and total gains 711 
are sufficiently high as they may be in SD-6 HPA.  This highlights how localized policies may 712 
be more beneficial than aquifer-wide policies when there are no other restrictions since the 713 
localized policies can substantially improve total benefits and take into consideration local 714 
circumstances.  715 
Determinants of Net Benefits  716 
In this section we analyze how the attributes of the farmers and their location contribute to gains 717 
from the simple management policies.  We use an ordinary least squares regression to identify 718 
the average contribution of natural recharge, Ri, initial saturated thickness, STi, irrigated acreage, 719 
IAi, initial lift, Li, initial irrigated acreage of neighboring farms11, Ni, hydraulic conductivity, Ki, 720 
the land elevation at the well SLi, the water demand intercept, WDIi, and a binary variable to 721 
indicate if the farmer’s well dries up in the perfect competition scenario, DRYi, to individual 722 
present value gain in net benefit, NBi.  We include squared terms of all the variables to capture 723 
non-linearities.  We split the observations into two groups, farmers that gain from the policy and 724 
farmers that do not gain from the policy when compared to the baseline scenario.  The farmers 725 
that gain a positive amount from the policy are generally the farmers who have the life of their 726 
well extended before it dries up, but the categories are not perfectly correlated.  A change in net 727 
benefit is recorded as a percentage gain (loss) above (below) the perfect competition net benefit 728 
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for farmer i.  Equation (18) describes the equation estimated and the results are reported in table 729 
6. 730 
 731 
𝑁𝐵𝑖 = 𝛽
0 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑖) + 𝛽
2(𝑆𝑇𝑖) + 𝛽
3(𝐼𝐴𝑖) + 𝛽
4(𝐿𝑖) + 𝛽
5(𝑁𝑖) + 𝛽
6(𝐾𝑖) + 𝛽
6(𝐸𝐿𝑖) + 𝛽
7(𝑊𝐷𝐼𝑖) + 𝛽
8(𝐷𝑅𝑌𝑖)732 
+ 𝛽9(𝑅𝑖
2) + 𝛽10(𝑆𝑇𝑖
2) + 𝛽11(𝐼𝐴𝑖
2) + 𝛽12(𝐿𝑖
2) + 𝛽13(𝑁𝑖
2) + 𝛽14(𝐾𝑖
2) + 𝛽15(𝐸𝐿𝑖
2)+ 𝑖      (18) 733 
 734 
 We only report the results from the flat tax scenarios because they are very similar to the 735 
variable tax results.  It is apparent that the flat tax yielded an increase in net benefit because it 736 
extends the life of the aquifer in certain areas, the water market does this to a lesser extent.   737 
Farmers with positive net benefit under a flat tax policy, column (2) of table 6, exhibit a negative 738 
association between the percentage gain and saturated thickness.   A larger saturated thickness 739 
leads to smaller gains because the farmers are less likely to run out of water.   To a lesser extent 740 
more productive areas, as indicated by the larger demand intercept, and areas with smaller lift 741 
gain more as well, as shown in column (2) of table 6. 742 
 Figure 8 shows the spatial distribution of the farmers with an increase in net benefits 743 
under a flat tax policy, represented by the shaded cells.  When compared to figure 1 there is an 744 
obvious correlation between the areas of the aquifer that have a short life span and the locations 745 
with an increase in net benefit. 746 
In column (1) of table 6, we investigate the farmers that experience a negative net benefit 747 
under the flat tax policy, that is, the farmers that are worse off than if there was no policy at all.  748 
Of the farmers whose net benefits decline under the flat tax, the ones that do worse have less 749 
productive land and whose wells don’t run dry.  This result is driven by the fact that these 750 
farmers have lower marginal benefits from irrigation in each time period and with a large 751 
saturated thickness the wells do not dry up in the baseline scenario.   752 
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When water is allocated through a water market the distribution of water use changes in 753 
each time period, but we see a similar set of correlates driving the results.   Column (4) of table 6 754 
shows the results for farmers with an increase in net benefits under a water market compared to 755 
the baseline scenario.  Farmers with smaller saturated thickness and smaller lift see larger 756 
increases in net benefits: areas with a smaller lift have smaller extraction costs on average and 757 
areas with smaller saturated thickness see their groundwater last further into the future with a 758 
policy.   Under the flat tax scenario, the signs on the coefficients of lift are different between 759 
farmers with positive net benefits in the market and negative net benefits from the flat tax, 760 
largely because in the flat tax scenario farmers with larger lifts also had larger saturated 761 
thickness and did not have their well dry up, while the benefactors of the market had larger lifts 762 
which allocated them less water through the market, but allowed them to pump longer through 763 
this reduced pumping and increased their gains.  Another aspect that is different in the water 764 
markets compared to the flat tax policy is that the water demand intercept, which is related to the 765 
size of the marginal gains in a period, is negatively correlated with net benefits under the water 766 
market but positively correlated with net benefits under the flat tax policy.  This arises from the 767 
relationship between the equilibrium allocations in the water market and the exhaustion of the 768 
aquifer in relatively thin saturated areas. All the farmers whose net benefits increase from the 769 
water market extend the life of their well to some degree compared to the baseline scenario but 770 
the areas with smaller saturated thickness and smaller water demand intercepts extend the life 771 
further into the future through lower water allocations in the water market in the earlier periods 772 
and obtain larger gains, even if that benefit is inadvertent since the water market does not 773 
explicitly value the life span of a well.  This phenomenon also produces the signs on the 774 
coefficient of Well dried up, as farmers that gain from the water market are primarily ones that 775 
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have smaller allocations of water and extend the life of their well which produces a positive sign 776 
on the coefficient for Well dried up. While farmers that do worse in the water market have larger 777 
allocations of water and shorten the life span of their well which produces a negative sign on the 778 
coefficient for Well dried up. Water markets allocate water permits to the areas with higher 779 
current period marginal gains regardless of future period consequences. As a result the life of 780 
some wells is shortened under a water market which drives the overall difference between the 781 
gains from a simple flat tax and a water market with the identical total water quantities.  To 782 
separate the contrasting effects of 1) the gain from allocating to highly productive areas in the 783 
current period through markets and 2) the loss from earlier exhaustion caused by allocating to 784 
highly productive areas with a thin saturated thickness, let us consider the gains from a water 785 
market after the first period of the simulation because this isolates the gain from reallocating 786 
under the water market.  Comparing the aggregate net benefit for the aquifer with the optimal flat 787 
tax of 547% after year 1 in the simulation to the net benefit with the same total extraction in year 788 
1 but allocations using a water market, the aggregate net benefit under the water market after the 789 
first period is approximately 0.35% greater than the net benefit from the flat tax scenario after 790 
the first period.  This relatively small gain in allocative efficiency shows that even a small 791 
negative effect from earlier exhaustion of the most productive locations in an aquifer could, and 792 
does, cause a larger decrease in net benefits than the gains from a more efficient distribution.  793 
This suggests that there might be good reason to have restrictions on trading in areas close to 794 
depletion or to include other mechanisms that consider the exhaustion of wells as a component of 795 
policy: this is further supported by the findings from the LEMA water market that improves on 796 
the simple pricing and quantity restriction policies.  This might also be reason why currently 797 
functioning water markets are typically restricted to small areas where the common pool 798 
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assumption is reasonable (for example, in Australia and U.S.) or else feature complex trading 799 
and zoning rules that place additional restrictions on the markets.12   Further work in this area 800 
would be beneficial, similar to the work on depletion of surface water flows from groundwater 801 
pumping based on distance (Brozovic and Young 2014). 802 
 803 
Conclusion  804 
We assess the benefits of simple groundwater policies in a detailed spatial model of groundwater 805 
extraction that is applied to the Ogallala aquifer in Northwest Kansas.  In an aquifer where the 806 
intensity of water demand is uneven across the aquifer and where each farmer faces different 807 
saturated thickness it is not obvious how these policies would perform or how much they would 808 
contribute to increasing the aquifer-wide net benefit.  When these physical heterogeneities are 809 
present and the aquifer is depletable, we find that while simple pricing policies and quantity 810 
restrictions yield small increases the overall net benefits, on average, to farmers from water 811 
extracted for irrigation these policies may be counter-productive for many farmers.  In Kansas 812 
the increase in net benefit is highly skewed towards the farmers that run out of water in the base 813 
(no policy) case and therefore cannot continue farming, while any form of management allows 814 
them to extend the life of their farm and realize profits further into the future.  But the simple 815 
pricing and quantity policies that may extend the life of the aquifer for some may be very 816 
damaging to others.  By instituting a static water market to aid in a more efficient distribution of 817 
groundwater in each period but without regard to future consequences, the overall discounted net 818 
benefit over the life of the aquifer decreased compared to the simple pricing policies.   This may 819 
point to the need for more spatially or temporally targeted water markets with additional 820 
restrictions when implemented over a large heterogeneous area, which is seen in practice in some 821 
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areas of the United States and Australia.  The local area management by LEMAs in Kansas re-822 
inforce this finding as focused localized policies may be substantially more effective at 823 
increasing benefits of farmers compared to other simple policies like a tax that is uniform over 824 
space and/or time.  This is also relevant to the simple water markets, as they enhance net benefits 825 
much better in a localized setting than across larger sections of the aquifer.   826 
 While the average net benefit from management may be relatively small, there is large 827 
heterogeneity in the distribution of gains across farmers and areas.  Net benefits can easily 828 
exceed 50% of discounted profits in areas of high water scarcity.  Our results demonstrate the 829 
need to focus policy on areas that run out of water because these are the areas with the largest 830 
potential net benefits and are typically areas of concern for water managers, and show that the 831 
distribution of gains is just as, if not more, important than the average gains across all farmers 832 
when there are physical and demand heterogeneities.  In our model when a well runs out of 833 
groundwater the cost of no management, or no conservation, can be particularly high.  This result 834 
is similar to the one found in Koundouri and Christou (2006) who find that salt water intrusion 835 
which destroys the ground water stock in Cyprus can reduce welfare significantly when there is 836 
no backstop.   837 
 In all the simple pricing scenarios that we investigate the net benefit to the median farmer 838 
is negative or close to zero.  This suggests that these policies are unlikely to pass a popular vote 839 
in Kansas.  This emphasizes why local policies could be a more popular mechanism for 840 
groundwater management, since these policies can be targeted to areas with potentially large 841 
gains where the majority of farmers have positive net benefits such as in the Sheridan County 6 842 
High Priority Area (SD-6 HPA) in Kansas.   843 
 844 
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Table 1: Summary of Ogallala Aquifer Parameters 967 
Symbol Description Value 
I Number of farmers 2,088 
N Number of cells in aquifer 8,457 
Ri Average natural recharge of each cell 
in aquifer (acre feet per year) 
35.48  (max = 75.99;  
min = 26.67 ) 
Ai Surface area of aquifer of each cell 
(acres) 
625 
S Specific yield (unitless) 0.17 
Ki Average hydraulic conductivity for 
each cell (feet/year) 
23,393  (max = 73,000;    
min = 3,394) 
CA0 Average cross sectional area of each 
cell at time 0 (acres) 
6.33 (max = 21.21; min = 0) 
d Distance between centroids of adjacent 
cells (feet) 
5,217 
LSi Average elevation of a cell (feet) 3,102  (max =4,024; min = 
2,104 ) 
gi Average farmer demand intercept (acre 
feet) 
178.84 (max = 1,022.31;   
min = 0.22 ) 
ki Average farmer demand slope (acre 
feet) 
-0.66 (max = -0.001;          
min = -3.17 ) 
C1a Cost increase of pumping from a one 
foot change in height ($/acre foot of  
lift) 
0.1044  
α Return coefficient to well 0.20 
r Rate of time preference 0.03 
T Time period length (year) 90 
δ Minimum saturated thickness for a 
farmer to pump water (feet) 
10 
aThe cost is calculated using parameters from Hendricks and Peterson (2012) the 968 
average price of gas ($/Mcf), $4.68, and the amount of natural gas used to lift one 969 
acre foot of water one foot high, 0.0223 (Mcf). 970 
 971 
 972 
Table 2: Water Demand Statistics 973 
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 Mean Standard Dev. 
Applied Water per Acre (feet) 1.1107 0.4501 
Cost of Pumping (dollars per acre foot) 13.3620 6.5895 
Jan-April Precipitation (inches) 3.5658 2.0579 
May-August Precipitation (inches) 11.4602 4.8201 
May-August Evapotranspiration (inches) 37.5238 6.0554 
 974 
Table 3: Water Demand Estimates 975 
 Dependent Var: Applied Water per Acre 
Cost of Pumping ($ acre foot) -0.00395***   (0.0014) 
Jan-April Precipitation 0.0041            (0.0063) 
May-August Precipitation -0.0039           (0.0029) 
May-August Evapotranspiration -0.0023           (0.0032) 
Observations 29,177 
R2 0.4003 
 
 
Number of Groups 1473 
Note: Standard errors are parentheses and coefficients on time fixed effects are not reported.  976 
Asterisk(*) denotes variables significant at 10%. 977 
  978 
Table 4: Results Summary Statistics 979 
% Gain in Discounted Farmer’s Net Benefits 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Flat Tax 
(FT) 
Variable Tax 
(VT) 
Quantity 
Restrictions 
(QR) 
Water Market 
with FT 
Quantities 
Water Market 
with VT 
Quantities 
Water Market 
with QR 
Restrictions 
Total Gain 1.02% 1.06% 0.00% 0.99% 0.99% 0.11% 
Min -100.00% -100.00% -1.99% -100.00% -100.00% -6.73% 
Max 720.73% 722.33% 9.44% 7,071.90% 189.79% 5,469.07% 
Average 0.34% 0.38% -0.01% 63.86% 0.09% 10.75% 
Median -0.23% -0.20% 0.00% 11.51% -0.51% 0.00% 
 980 
Table 5: LEMA SD-6 HPA Results  981 
 
Aquifer 
wide Flat 
Tax 
SD-6 HPA 
Flat Tax 
Aquifer 
wide 
Quantity 
Restriction 
SD-6 HPA 
Quantity 
Restriction 
SD-6 Water 
Market with 
FT 
Quantities 
SD-6 Water 
Market with 
QR 
Quantities 
Optimal Flat Tax Rate 547% 1362% - - - - 
Optimal Quantity 
Restricted 
- - 98% 32% 
 
- - 
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Total Gain 5.63% 7.25% 0.01% 8.81% 8.16% 11.55% 
Min -5.57% -32.01% 0.00% -21.66% -41.76% -46.25% 
Max 26.88% 15.54% 0.00% 25.67% 26.54% 25.57% 
Average 5.14% 6.76% 0.01% 9.44% 7.17% 10.40% 
Median 4.77% 7.84% 0.00% 13.75% 10.37% 14.37% 
Note: The results here are the percent gains by the group of farmers in SD-6 HPA, under locally focused 982 
policies and aquifer wide policies. 983 
 984 
 985 
Table 6: Drivers of Discounted Welfare Gains 986 
 Dependent Var: % Gain from Policy 
 FT (1) FT (2) WMFT (3) WMFT (4) 
% Gains > 0 No Yes No Yes 
Acreage irrigated 7.61E-05 5.65E-04 3.95E-04*** 3.37E-03* 
Saturated thickness -6.44E-04** -8.74E-03*** -1.82E-03*** -7.23E-02*** 
Lift -4.75E-04** 2.31E-03 4.90E-04 2.05E-02** 
Hydraulic conductivity -3.60E-06 2.02E-05 7.06E-06 1.36E-04 
Recharge 5.35E-04 1.78E-02 -5.78E-03 -1.48E-01* 
Neighbor’s irr. acres 1.70E-05 3.59E-05 -4.98E-05 -9.99E-04** 
Elevation 1.49E-04 -1.45E-04 1.69E-03*** 6.09E-03 
Water demand intercept 1.12E-01*** 2.24E-02 1.15E-02 -4.14E+00*** 
Well dried up  -1.59E-02 2.48E-02 -3.50E-02* 1.29E+00*** 
Acreage irrigated sq. -3.72E-07*** -5.13E-07 -9.20E-07*** -4.16E-07 
Saturated thickness sq. 4.54E-06*** 4.65E-05*** 5.98E-06* 3.16E-04*** 
Lift sq. 1.19E-07 -4.03E-06 -7.92E-06 -1.43E-04* 
Hydraulic cond. sq. 1.55E-10 -6.46E-10 -2.56E-10 -5.48E-09 
Recharge sq. -9.18E-06 -2.29E-04 1.95E-04*** 2.10E-03** 
Neighbor’s irr. acres sq. 2.15E-11 -1.85E-08 1.66E-08 3.53E-07** 
Elevation sq. -3.13E-08* 2.05E-08 -2.40E-07*** -7.82E-07 
Observations 1,537 501 647 1,391 
R2 0.2247 
 
 
0.0875 0.1351 0.2194 
Asterisks (*) double asterisks (**) and triple asterisks (***) denote variables significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 987 
respectively. 988 
 989 
 990 
 991 
 992 
 993 
 994 
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Figure 1: Estimated Useful Lifetime for the High Plains Aquifer in Northwest Kansas 999 
Figure 2: 8,457 Cell Model of Northern Kansas, Ogallala Aquifer 1000 
Figure 3: Total Groundwater Extraction Paths 1001 
Figure 4: Total Discounted Net Benefit from Flat Tax Policy 1002 
Figure 5: Distribution of Discounted Net Benefit Under Optimal Flat Tax Policy 1003 
Figure 6: Quantity Restriction 1004 
Figure 7: LEMA SD-6 HPA in Northwest Kansas 1005 
Figure 8: Well Locations with Positive Gains from Flat Tax 1006 
 1007 
 
1 We do not calculate the first best policies due to computational limitations.   There is a trade-off in adding a finer 
level of spatial detail and the ability to calculate a first best policy for the entire aquifer.  Guilfoos et al. (2013) 
evaluate the welfare gains from groundwater management under a first best policy in an aquifer with substantially 
less spatial detail. 
2 When there is heterogeneity in the properties of the aquifer or the spacing of wells, the water price from a simple 
market may not be efficient.  When the water rights from a thick saturated area where there are few neighbors are 
sold to an area with a thin saturated area and many neighbors there is likely to be a larger negative pumping 
externality on the area with many neighbors than the area with few neighbors, this would suggest that a water price 
for permits should vary with location.  This is similar to the pollution permit literature where there are local 
concentration problems and benefits to ambient pollution standards or permits (Stavins 1995, Muller and 
Mendelsohn 2009).  When the spatial element of the pumping cost externality is not priced into the water market it 
is unclear how much welfare is gained by instituting a market, though spatial externalities are priced into markets in 
Palazzo and Brozovic (2014) and Kuwayama and Brozovic (2013) that price interactions between surface water and 
groundwater. 
3 If banking 100 acre feet of water: First the 15% is reduced from Consumptive Use (100*(1-.15)) = 85 acre feet.  
Then the additional 5% is reduced through a conservation reduction (85(1-.05)) = 80.75 acre feet. 
4 In this application we study an unconfined aquifer where this measure  is specific yield.  Storativity could be 
substituted for a confined and aquifer using the same model. 
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5 This is monitored by the Kansas Water Authority through metered pumps.  There are a small number of cases 
where pumping exceeds the authorized limits and farmers are subject to fines or forfeiture of their water rights all 
together.  Here we assume the limit is binding. 
6 We have also tried a tax that varies every period by assuming a simplified exponential functional form for the 
taxes, similar to Burness and Brill (2001), and find similar results.   
7 If the intercept is measured on a per acre basis, this shift in the intercept could be one measure that would be 
expected to vary closely with the productivity of the land over similar crops.  Later in the paper we employ fixed 
effects that estimates different water demand intercepts on a per acre basis. 
8 During each year farmers extract water and water flows laterally between neighbors.  Because the size of the cells 
is rather small in this simulation we allow water to flow laterally four times during one time period and convert the 
yearly hydrologic conductivity to units of feet per one quarter of a year.  For example, for a cell with the average 
annual hydraulic conductivity of 10,000, we transform K = 2,500 acre feet per quarter of a year. The benefit of this 
is that is removes the likelihood that the dynamics of the model will be jumpy and devolve into a chaotic system, 
which is a remnant of the fact that we model this process in discrete time and not continuous time.   
9 Code for our model can be found at https://sites.google.com/site/toddguilfoos/ for replication. 
10 The model estimated is ActualHeight2010n = β*PredictedHeight2010n + εn, where n is the number of cells in the 
aquifer.  We find a high R-squared and a coefficient β that is highly significant and equal to 1.003. 
11 The variable neighboring farms is defined as the eight cells surrounding a farmer and represents a summation of 
the total irrigated acreage in the eight surrounding cells. 
12 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
